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investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price
adjustments. Using weekly, station-level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether
asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the
investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre-collapse pricing (cyclical markets).
Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the
announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more
symmetric.
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THE EFFECT OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION ON PRICING:
EVIDENCE FROM THE COLLAPSE OF A GASOLINE CARTEL
ROBERT CLARK
HEC MONTREAL
JEAN-FRANC¸OIS HOUDE
WHARTON AND NBER
ABSTRACT. We study the collapse of collusion in Que´bec’s retail gasoline market following a Com-
petition Bureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins,
and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station-level prices we test whether collusion
was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel’s strategy. We do so
in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar
pre-collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical
markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical
markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2004 the Canadian Competition Bureau launched an investigation in an effort to uncover ev-
idence that collusion was taking place in the retail gasoline markets of four cities in Que´bec: Victo-
riaville, Thetford Mines, Sherbrooke, and Magog.1 Around 130 stations and over sixty firms were
thought to be involved, and fourteen companies and thirty-nine individuals were charged.2 Our
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1Appendix A presents a legal disclaimer and describes the Competition Bureau documents on which we base part of
our economic analysis.
2The allegations of the Competition Bureau have not been proven in a court of justice. As of September 2012 seven
companies (including some of the larger players in the target markets) and twenty-seven individuals had pleaded
guilty to the charges with fines ranging from $90,000 to $1,850,000 for the companies, and from $3,000 to $50,000 for the
individuals. All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted. The competition bureau of Canada provides
the details of the charges in this file (03079) on its website: CompetitionBureau.gc.ca. Other cases are still before the
courts, and charges have been stayed against some companies, including Couche Tard (see file number 2012 QCCS
4721 at Canlii.ca).
objective in this paper is to quantify the impact of explicit communication on pricing by studying
the collapse of these four cartels following the announcement of the Bureau’s investigation.
In the first part of the paper, we document the existence of two pricing patterns in the cartels:
(i) high retail margins, and (ii) asymmetric price adjustments. We show that the four cities tar-
geted by the investigation exhibited stable margins (20% higher than the rest of the province), and
asymmetric pricing during the Competition Bureau investigation and for over two years prior.
Specifically, although cost changes were symmetric, price increases were large and sudden, while
decreases were smaller in magnitude and occurred both more frequently, and following long pe-
riods of sticky prices. Moreover, over the same period and holding fixed the sequence of cost
changes, we show that about 30% of stations located elsewhere in the province featured the same
cyclical patterns, while the remainder had low margins and symmetric price adjustments.
In the second part of the paper, we quantify the effect of explicit communication on these two
pricing patterns. After gathering information in the target markets for over a year through wire
taps and on-site investigation, the Bureau announced its investigation by executing search war-
rants in May 2006. We hypothesize that the execution of the warrants increased the fear of criminal
prosecution, and therefore caused the collapse of the collusive agreement in the four markets tar-
geted by the investigation.
Our main empirical tests consist of comparing the change in pricing behavior of stations located
in the target cities, with the changes in pricing behavior amongst stations throughout the province.
Since there is heterogeneity across the province in the patterns of price adjustments prior to the
announcement, we perform a difference-in-difference analysis comparing stations in the collusive
cities to stations in two control groups: (i) competitive markets (i.e. low margins and symmetric
pricing), and (ii) cyclical markets (i.e. high margins and asymmetric pricing). This strategy allows
us to identify two potential effects of the announcement: a direct effect on pricing in the collusive
markets, and an indirect spillover effect on pricing in the cyclical markets.
Our results show that following the announcement, margins fell by around 2.25 cents per litre
(cpl) in the target market, and by around 1 cpl in the cyclical markets. As a result of these de-
creases, margins in the target markets became indistinguishable from those in the most compet-
itive markets of the province (i.e. margins between 3 and 4 cpl). We also find that most of the
asymmetry in price adjustments disappeared following the announcement in the target markets,
and was reduced by half in the other cyclical markets. This result is mostly driven by a significant
increase in the frequency and magnitude of price cuts, although price increases are also less im-
portant after the collapse. We therefore conclude that collusion was successful in the four markets
targeted by the investigation, and that a primary function of explicit communication was to limit
the amount of undercutting during price decreases.
These results are also consistent with the conjecture that collusion was widespread in the province,
although not necessarily conclusive. To our knowledge the Competition Bureau investigation was
not extended to other markets, and so there is no direct evidence of explicit communication among
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players outside the target markets. The reaction of firms in the cyclical markets to the announce-
ment may simply have been the result of not wanting to raise suspicions as a result of their pricing
strategies.
Our findings on asymmetric price adjustments have implications for our understanding of price
movements in commodity markets such as gasoline. Because every station in our data set faces
the same sequence of wholesale price shocks, the cyclical pattern that we measure reflects both
the fact that prices adjust faster to cost increases than cost decreases, and that on average price
increases are larger and less frequent than price decreases. The former phenomenon has often
been refereed to as rocket-and-feathers pass-through, first documented by Bacon (1991) in the UK
and by (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert 1997) in the U.S.3 The latter has been more recently
associated with Edgeworth cycles (Edgeworth (1925)), and arises independently of cost changes
(see Castanias and Johnson (1993) for an early paper). Our results show that both patterns can be
the result of collusive behavior. Market power has often been invoked as a possible explanation
for asymmetric pass-through (e.g. Deltas (2008), and Borenstein et al. (1997)), but Edgeworth
cycles have more commonly been explained by the non-cooperative model of Maskin and Tirole
(1988) (e.g. Eckert (2002), and Noel (2007a)). This is not to say that every cycle documented in
the literature is the result of explicit collusion, especially since recent papers in this literature have
documented recurrent short-lived cycles that arise even with constant costs (e.g. Noel (2007b) and
Lewis (2009)). Instead, we interpret our results as suggesting that pricing cycles that involve long
episodes of sticky prices and that span multiple weeks are consistent with explicit collusion.
Our paper is related to a large literature focused on estimating cartel overcharges. Recent stud-
ies include Connor (2007) and Bolotova et al. (2008).4 The idea of measuring the spillover effect
of antitrust enforcement activities dates back at least to Block et al. (1981), who study collusion in
the American bread industry in the 1960’s. They measure the effect of cartel detection activities in
one city on pricing in neighboring cities, and find that antitrust investigations reduce markups.
Our analysis also complements studies on collusion in gasoline markets. Earlier work on the
topic includes Borenstein and Shepard (1996), as well as Slade’s (1987, 1992) analysis of tacit col-
lusion in Vancouver. Erutku and Hildebrand (2010) estimate the collusion overcharges in the
Sherbrooke market. Their results show that following the announcement, prices decreased by
nearly 2 cpl relative to Montreal, but not at all relative to Que´bec City. Although we use more
detailed station-level data, our results are consistent with theirs, and provide an explanation for
their findings: stations in Que´bec City are part of the cyclical markets and reacted in the same way
to the announcement. More recently, Erutku (2011) builds on the conclusions found in this paper,
and measures the change in the pass-through rate of wholesale prices in Sherbrooke following the
announcement of the charges. Wang (2008, 2009) studies gasoline retail markets in Australia that
were the subject of a price-fixing investigation. The Australian cartel shares several features with
ours, including asymmetric price adjustments.5
3Similar patterns have been noted in a wide range of retail markets by Peltzman (2000)
4See Connor and Lande (2006) and Bolotova and Connor (2006) for recent surveys of this literature.
5See also de Roos and Katayama (2010) for an analysis pricing cycles in Australia over the same period.
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In a companion paper, Clark and Houde (2011), we analyze the internal organization of the
Que´bec cartels. The objective of the paper is to explain the mechanism used by an actual cartel to
solve the enforcement and coordination problems that arise in price-posting markets with hetero-
geneous firms. We use documents submitted by the Competition Bureau to the Superior Court of
Que´bec containing summaries of and extracts from recorded conversations between participants
to first describe the organizational form of the cartel, including the communication patterns and
pricing strategy employed. We then provide evidence of the existence of a mechanism based on
the ordering of moves and adjustment delays during price changes in which market share is trans-
ferred to “stronger” players. Finally, we estimate the implicit market share gains of the “stronger”
players, and evaluate the importance of the transfers for cartel stability.
The focus of the current paper is quite different. Although we also rely on the Competition
Bureau documents, we are interested in using micro-level price data to study the impact of the
collapse of the cartels on margins and adjustment asymmetry in the target markets, and other
markets throughout the province.
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the role of
explicit communication in the cartels. In Section 3 we describe the price survey and our choice of
sample. In Section 4 we describe the pricing patterns in the target markets during and before the
investigated period, and compare these with patterns in the rest of the province. In Section 5 we
describe our main empirical results. We conclude the paper in Section 6. The appendices contain
a legal disclaimer, information on the origin of the Competition Bureau investigation, as well as
additional maps and figures.
2. THE ROLE OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION
Our understanding of the method of functioning of the alleged cartels is based primarily on
the documents submitted by the Competition Bureau to the Court. The wire taps took place from
March to June 2005 in Victoriaville and Thetford Mines, and from March to June 2005 and Decem-
ber 2005 to April 2006 in Sherbrooke/Magog. The documents list the phone calls for each price
adjustment. An extract or a summary of the conversation is given along with information about
who made the call, who received it, and the time of the call. For each price change, we coded the
content of reported conversations in order to measure the number, time, and direction of phone
calls. In Clark and Houde (2011), we use this information to study the timing of price changes for
each player.
In the four cities investigated, the cartels are structured around a leader who controls a large
fraction of stations in his respective market. The main role of the leader is to coordinate the timing
and magnitude of price increases. He is helped in this role by a group of stations that actively
monitor the behavior of their competitors to ensure that everybody follows the instructions. As
we describe in detail in Clark and Houde (2011), price increases are difficult to coordinate because
of the presence of a group of more efficient stations, that have less incentives to collude, and
therefore are allowed extra time to raise their prices as a form of transfer. This differential timing
during adjustments creates tensions, and the ability of firms to actively communicate helps to
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implement the agreement. Indeed, we document a large volume of communications during price
increases: in Victoriaville, where 25 stations are active, 65 phone calls on average are recorded
during a typical increase.6
Price decreases are coordinated very differently. Nearly every price cut documented by the Bu-
reau is initiated by Ultramar, which is a vertically integrated firm operating the largest network of
stations in the province. Importantly, this firm advertizes a “low-price guarantee” (or LPG) policy,
and has built a reputation for setting the lowest price in a neighborhood around each of its stations.
The company does not announce price cuts in advance, but the recorded communications suggest
that firms are easily able to anticipate upcoming decreases. Most of these decreases are small,
typically 1 cpl, and rarely occur more than once a week, often every two weeks. The leader’s role
in coordinating price decreases is to instruct firms to match the lowest price in the market. This
process requires relatively few conversations: on average 25 phone calls are recorded during price
decreases. Nevertheless, communication is important for the stability of the cartel since it prevents
firms from systematically undercutting one another. Indeed, we document several conversations
in which the leader reminds other stations to wait for his call before matching Ultramar’s price,
and to never undercut the new price.
These findings suggest that communication serves three distinct roles: (i) to coordinate and ne-
gotiate the timing of adjustments across players, (ii) to monitor fluctuations in market conditions
and pass along information about the optimal markup (given conditions), and (iii) to convince
dissidents or would-be-dissidents to participate.
Most of the conversations that we observe are associated with the first two roles. This is con-
sistent with Whinston (2008), who points out that if explicit communication serves a purpose it
must be via equilibrium selection since the set of sustainable outcomes is identified by subgame
perfection whether collusion is tacit or explicit.
According to the Competition Bureau documents, the cartel participants recognize these roles
and understand the value of being able to explicitly communicate. In a conversation from April
19th, 2005, the Irving regional representative informs the Couche Tard representative that Irving
is planning to prevent its employees from talking with their competitors about prices. The two
of them discuss the implications of this new policy. In their view, without communication ”it is
impossible to manage gasoline prices”.7 More specifically, they claim that without the ability to
discuss prices, they will be late on all of their price adjustments and they will see their volumes
fall,8 and that the agreement only works when information sharing is reciprocal.9 Furthermore,
they suggest that if communication were to be restricted, it would be necessary to ”pay people
6See Clark and Houde (2011) for further details on communication patterns, and price changes during the wire-tap.
7Translation from the original French conversation: ”c’est impossible de gerer les prix d’essence.”
8Translation from: ”en retard pour tous mes changement de prix et tu peux voir la degringolade de notre volume.”
9During this conversation, the Couche Tard representative says that she will not “freely” share price information with
Irving if other competitors refuse to share information in return (translation from: “Ce n’est pas parce-que tu es ban-
nieres Irving avec moi que je vais te donner l’information. Si les autres ne me parlent pas, moi je vais m’arranger toute
seule dans l’eau benite et je vais vous donner ca [les informations sur les prix] tout gratuitement?”).
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to wander around the territory” to monitor prices.10 This conversation suggests that the ability of
firms to share information about upcoming adjustments prevents prices from collapsing.
The third role for communication is also important, but less frequently observed since the Com-
petition Bureau documents cover only two deviations. However, it is interesting to note that de-
viations by dissidents are not immediately punished through price wars. Instead, the leader com-
municates directly, or indirectly through an intermediary, with the dissident, and issues threats
or negotiates a change in the agreement. This role for explicit communication can also be found
in Genesove and Mullin’s (2001) analysis of the Sugar Institute cartel, where it is more systematic
and formal than in our case. In the sugar case, the communication transcripts do not include di-
rect discussion of prices or market shares, but the cartel sets rules in order to make detection of
deviation easier.
3. DATA
The data used in this analysis come from a weekly price survey conducted by the Re´gie de
l’e´nergie du Que´bec, the province’s energy market regulatory board, in order to administer a
price-floor policy. The floor is proportional to the spot price of refined gasoline (i.e. rack), and
is published every Tuesday.11 The Re´gie surveys a sample of stations throughout the province in
order to monitor prices. We obtained the prices and address of each of the 354 stations surveyed
through a confidentiality agreement with the Re´gie. Since most stations are surveyed every week,
the panel has a small attrition rate of 0.19%. We also obtained data on the weekly price floor for
all regions of the province directly from the Re´gie’s website.
To conduct our empirical analysis we focus on the period between January 2002 and March
2007, when the Re´gie data set ends. We identify a group of stations that are surveyed for most
of the weeks in this period. More specifically, we use 128 stations, with survey lengths varying
between 263 and 270 weeks. These stations are thus observed for a large number of consecutive
periods, and experienced the same sequence of aggregate demand and cost shocks. There are a
total of six stations from the target markets in this restricted group (two in Sherbrooke, two in
Victoriaville, and one in each of Thetford Mines and Magog); the rest are distributed across the
province according to the population of gasoline stations. For most of our analysis we restrict our
sample to this almost balanced panel because we construct statistics that require a large number
of observations before and after the announcement of the accusations. We also drop stations that
are located within 50 kms of the target markets so as not to capture any demand spillover effects
of the announcement. The final panel includes 125 stations.
Figure 5 in the Appendix presents the evolution of prices and the floor prior to the announce-
ment, along with the key dates of the Competition Bureau investigation: the publication of a
newspaper article in Victoriaville that triggered the investigation (Summer 2004), and the periods
10Translation from: ”payer des gens qui se promenent dans le champs”.
11The objective of the floor is to prevent below-cost pricing, and protect the average-sized station in the market. The
level of the floor approximates the cost of acquiring gasoline for stations that do not benefit from a long-term agreement
with a supplier, which lowers the transaction wholesale price (e.g. volume discount or guaranteed margins). As a
result, it is reasonable to expect that most stations’ marginal costs are below the floor. Carranza et al. (2012) analyze the
content of the regulation and its impact on the market.
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covered by the wire-tap recordings (the grey areas). To construct this figure we choose one station
per city that was always surveyed by the Re´gie.
The pre-announcement window is selected based on information from the Competition Bureau
documents and the newspaper article documenting collusive behavior, which suggest that col-
lusion had been taking place for some time when the investigation started.12 However, we also
consider a shorter 74 weeks pre-announcement window in our empirical analysis. This window
is chosen to correspond to the period extending to just before the beginning of the wire-taps. The
post-announcement window is constrained to 41 weeks by data availability. We discuss this limi-
tation below.
In our regressions we also make use of data from Kent Marketing, the leading gasoline market
research firm in Canada. The Kent data contain information on the name and location of stations
throughout Quebec. We use this information to construct measures of market structure at the
municipality level. Specifically, we are interested in measuring the total number of stations, the
share selling branded gasoline, the one-firm concentration ratio and the HHI, measured using the
share of stations by brand. We also use data on the ownership of underground-storage tanks to
measure the vertical integration of stations. This information is provided by the Que´bec Ministry
of Natural Resources, and is available for 2003.
4. GASOLINE PRICES PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT
In this section we first characterize the pricing behavior of stations in the target markets before
the announcement, using the price survey from the Re´gie and the prices reported in the Compe-
tition Bureau documents. We do so both during the weeks of the wire-tap period, and during the
entire collusive period from 2002 to 2006. We then characterize pricing throughout the province
using the Re´gie price survey.
4.1. Pricing patterns in the target markets. Figure 1 shows the price changes that occurred in
the four cities during the wire-tap periods (March to June 2005 for Victoriaville, Thetford Mines,
Sherbrooke, and Magog, along with December 2005 to April 2006 for Sherbrooke and Magog).
For each city, the dotted green is the Re´gie-imposed price floor. The solid orange line is the me-
dian price in the Re´gie data. The blue dots represent the prices set by all of the stations listed in
Competition Bureau documents. These documents provide a complete picture of almost all price
adjustments that occurred in Victoriaville and Thetford Mines during the wire-tap period, and so
we are able to determine exact prices for most of the stations on almost all of the price increase
attempts.13 A smaller fraction of the stations are referred to in the documents for Sherbrooke and
Magog, especially during price decreases.
The figures are meant to illustrate the accuracy of the Re´gie survey. Despite the fact that the
survey is performed only once a week, it precisely tracks the price changes documented by the
Bureau through wire-taps and visual inspections. This is in part due to the lack of price dispersion
12See Appendix B for an extract from the original article.
13Although not all stations are mentioned, our understanding of the court documents is that stations that set a price
below the agreed upon price are always mentioned since they are causing problems for coordination.
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FIGURE 1. Prices in the four cities during the wire-tap period
in the four markets, and to the fact that most price changes occur once a week.14 The figures also
illustrate a recognizable pattern of price adjustments: large price increase (4-8 cents per liter),
followed by a period of a week or two during which prices are stable, and then by a sequence of
smaller price decreases.
In Table I we present statistics on margins and price adjustments for the four cities. Margins
are measured as the difference between the posted price and the corresponding price floor.15 We
present median station-level margins over a given period t, averaged across all stations belonging
to each market. In the table we report the statistic for two periods: t = before the wire-tap, and t =
during the wire-tap. The degree of asymmetric price adjustment for a given station j is measured
as the ratio of median price increases over the median price decreases, adjusted for the ratio of
14See Clark and Houde (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the cross-sectional distribution of prices that the cartel
leaders agree upon.
15Since the floor approximates the cost of acquiring gasoline for most stations, it is a good proxy for wholesale price.
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TABLE I. Summary statistics on price changes during the wiretap and before the
announcement
Wiretap period 2002 / 2006
Sherbrooke Thetford Victoria- Sherbrooke Thetford Victoria- Floor
/Magog Mines ville /Magog Mines ville
Variables
Increases 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.50 4.40 1.50
Decreases -2.00 -2.13 -1.60 -1.45 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00
Adjust. ratio 1.75 2.06 2.73 3.54 3.00 2.93
Med. margin 6.88 7.70 5.90 6.88 7.60 6.85
The price adjustment statistics between 2002 and June 2006 are calculated using the weekly price survey conducted
by the Re´gie de l’e´nergie du Que´bec. The adjustment statistics in the target markets during the wire tap periods are
calculated from the Competition Bureau documents (i.e. the phone calls).
median cost changes (measured by the price floor). This statistic is calculated independently for
each station, and defined over a given period t. Equation 1 provides more details, and uses w to
index weeks.
Adjustment ratiojt =
Median price increasesjt
Median price decreasesjt
/
Median floor increasesjt
Median floor decreasesjt
,(1)
Where,
Median price increasesjt = Med ({pjw}|w ∈ t,∆pjw > 0) ,
Median price decreasesjt = Med ({pjw}|w ∈ t,∆pjw < 0) .
Median floor increases and decreases are defined analogously. In Section 5 we define the adjust-
ment ratio and median margins for two slightly different periods: t = before the announcement,
and t = after the announcement.
The ratio is equal to 1 if pricing is symmetric: price and cost changes are of similar magnitude.
We focus on station-level medians rather than means since there are some outliers in the price
changes. For instance, following the announcement, stations in the target markets tried on a few
occasions to restore the high margins they had been earning before. These attempts were unsuc-
cessful, causing prices to fall back to the price floor. We also observe some negative margins in
our data suggesting that there may be an imperfect match between the date of read for prices and
the price floor.
In the four cities, median margins were equal to 6.69 cpl during the wire-tap period, compared
to 5.56 cpl for the whole province.16 Using the station-level panel we constructed from the Compe-
tition Bureau documents, we measure price increases to be at least twice as large as price decreases.
The adjustment ratio was equal to 1.75 in Sherbrooke/Magog, 2.06 in Thetford Mines, and 2.73 in
Magog.
In the right-hand side of Table I, we show that the patterns we identified during the wire-tap
period were also present in the earlier period. Between 2002 and the announcement in June of
2006, average margins were equal to 6.96 cpl in the four cities, compared to 5.08 cpl for the whole
16This is the average over the station-level median margins during this period.
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FIGURE 2. Distribution of weekly price and cost changes in the collusive cities from
2002 to 2006
province. Moreover, the adjustment ratios measured between 2002 and 2006 are closer to 3 over
the extended period. Note that while price increases are much larger than price decreases, price
floor adjustments are fairly symmetric, with decreases slightly larger than increases.
The asymmetric pricing pattern is confirmed in Figure 2. Figure 2a shows that the distribution
of price increases is symmetric around four cpl (with an inter-quartile range of two cents), while
the density of price cuts is quickly increasing towards zero and clustered around one or two cents
(i.e. 70% are less than or equal to two in absolute value). The distribution of cost changes, shown
in Figure 2b, is more symmetric, confirming that prices adjust faster upwards than downwards.
Indeed, the ratio of price increases over decreases, adjusted for the ratio of cost changes, shows
that price increases are more than twice the size of price decreases.
This asymmetry implies frequent periods of price stickiness. The majority of price changes are
zero over the period. In Victoriaville and Thetford Mines, prices are constant two weeks in a row
48% and 57% of the time respectively. Sherbrooke tends to exhibit more volatility; the proportion
of stable weeks is 36%. In comparison, the price floor remains constant only 1.2% of the time.
The differences between the wire-tap period and the 2002-2006 period reflect an episode of price
instability in 2005, especially in Victoriaville and Sherbrooke/Magog. A first episode of instability
occurred in the first quarter of 2005 in Victoriaville, following newspaper article documenting the
occurrence of price wars in Victoriaville in the Summer of 2004 and the subsequent visit of Com-
petition Bureau agents to various gasoline stations in the region in the Fall of 2004. Similarly, our
analysis of the transcripts of wire-tap recordings illustrates that cooperation became increasingly
difficult in Sherbrooke starting in the summer of 2005.
4.2. Pricing patterns in the rest of the province. Figure 3 plots the joint density of the two out-
come variables for every station in Que´bec prior to the execution of the warrants. The joint density
is clearly bi-modal suggesting both a strong positive correlation between margins and adjustment
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asymmetry, and the existence of two distinct types of stations. In the lower-left quadrant is a group
of stations with more competitive pricing: low margins and fairly symmetric price adjustments.
Margins are between 3 and 4 cpl, while adjustment asymmetries are measured to be about 1.5.
Recall that the ratio should be equal to 1 if pricing is symmetric.
In the opposite quadrant (upper-right) is a group of stations with high margins and asymmetric
price adjustments. The stations from the target markets are all located in this part of the joint
density, with margins between 6 and 8 cpl, and adjustment asymmetries around 3 (see Table I).
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TABLE II. Market comparisons
REGIONS Capacity Nb. tanks % Major HHI (stations) Nb. Stations
X 1000 liters
Target 351 3.21 .277 0.041 16.3
(155) (0.402) (0.156) (0.054) (12.9)
Cyclical + Target 316 3.26 0.324 0.0834 13.1
(126) (0.519) (0.207) (0.132) (13.7)
Competitive 381 3.5 0.422 0.156 14.6
(158) (0.583) (0.272) (0.289) (28.5)
Mean difference test p-value 0.0051 0.0056 0.0119 .0443 0.657
East 303 3.2 0.333 0.113 12.3
(134) (0.554) (0.223) (0.261) (13.7)
West 389 3.54 0.408 0.125 15.3
(144) (0.522) (0.26) (0.191) (27.8)
Mean difference test p-value 0.0002 0.00008 0.0547 0.746 0.403
Stations outside of the target markets but situated in the upper-right quadrant of the figure are
those that we define as “cyclical”. The thresholds we use for assigning stations to this group is
the following: median margins greater than 6 cpl and adjustment asymmetries above 2 in the pre-
announcement period. The average value of margins in this group is 7.42 cpl, and the adjustment
asymmetry is measured to be 3.41. Stations outside the target markets and not satisfying the
criteria for assignment to this group will be referred to as competitive. The average margin and
adjustment asymmetry in the competitive group are 3.84 cpl and 1.57, respectively.
It is important to note that stations from the upper-right quadrant are mostly located in the
Eastern part of the province around Que´bec City, while more competitive markets are observed
around Montre´al and near the Ontario border. Specifically, 9.75% of cyclical cities are located the
Western part of the province, and 4% of the competitive cities are located in the East (see also
Figures 6 and 7 in the Appendix). Over the whole province we find that margins are 7.51 cpl in
the East versus 3.76 cpl in the West, and that adjustment asymmetry is 3.38 in the East and 1.56 in
the West (this is excluding the target markets from the East).
Table II illustrates the differences in market structure between the two types of markets and
regions. Overall, markets in the East are less urban, and exhibit smaller stations with less capacity
(measured by the size and number of underground storage tanks). Stations in the East also tend
to more often be independent. The difference in the HHI index and the number of stations also
suggests smaller networks in the cyclical markets, but this difference is not statistically significant
based on the East/West split.
Among the other regional differences, it is worth noting that stations in the East are predomi-
nantly supplied by Ultramar, which operates the only refinery in the region. The Que´bec refinery
also includes an independent terminal operated by Olco. In comparison, three additional termi-
nals were in operation in the mid-2000’s in Montre´al. A few markets in the West also border on
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the province of Ontario, where gasoline prices are unregulated. Finally, another important differ-
ence is the presence of the discount retailer Costco in a region just North of Montre´al. This station
maintains very low margins, and the government has regularly imposed a higher price floor in
this area.
Finally, note that the asymmetric pricing patterns that we observe in the cyclical markets differ
from the short-lived price cycles documented in several gasoline markets (see for instance Noel
(2007b) in Toronto, and Lewis (2009) in the U.S.). In the target and cyclical markets, price increases
occur on average once a month, and the time-series involve a significant amount of price stick-
iness. In comparison, the cycles measured by Noel (2007b) last on average one week, are of a
much larger amplitude (i.e. price increases are often 7 or 8 times larger than decreases), and are
not initiated by cost changes. The literature has provided examples of both short-lived and long-
lived cycles, and typically associates both types with Edgeworth cycles. See, in particular, Eckert
(2002) and Noel (2007a) for examples of cycles measured using weekly data. Websites compil-
ing consumer-reported gasoline prices provide clear evidence that prices in Montre´al (competi-
tive markets) do feature the same week-long cycles as in Toronto, while Que´bec (cyclical market)
prices are typically sticky for several days (often weeks).17
5. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION
Our objective is to quantify the impact of explicit communication on retail margins and pricing
adjustments. We do so by evaluating the impact of the public announcement of the Competition
Bureau investigation, as measured by the execution of the search warrants. We label this the direct
effect of the announcement.
In addition, the execution of the search warrants may have generated an indirect spillover
effect, causing the collapse of cartels in regions that were not targeted by the investigation. For this
to be the case, it must be that firms elsewhere were colluding, that the announcement raised the
probability of criminal prosecution, and that information about the investigation was diffused fast
enough. Our second test evaluates these hypotheses jointly. Although there is no direct evidence
of explicit price coordination in markets outside of those targeted by the Bureau, conversations
described in the Competition Bureau documents suggest that collusion was not unique to the
four target cities since firms sometimes discussed implementing similar price changes in other
markets.18 Moreover, some of the key players responsible for implementing price increases in the
target cities were involved in setting prices at stations elsewhere in the province, which likely sped
up the diffusion of the information concerning the investigation.19
In order to implement the tests, we construct three sub-samples of stations following the group-
ing suggested by the joint density of margins and price adjustment ratio presented in Figure 3. The
first includes stations located in one of the four target markets. The stations in these markets all
17See MontrealGasPrices.com.
18See for instance the conversation from April 19th 2005 between Claude Bedard of Irving and Celine Bonin of Couche
Tard that is described on pages 20-23 of Annexe B of the Competition Bureau documents.
19Using the data on ownership of underground-storage tanks provided by the Que´bec Ministry of Natural Resources
we document that 19% of the firms present in the target markets are also in other markets in the East, and that 16% also
have a presence in the West.
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receive the direct treatment, and henceforth will be labelled by TD. The second includes stations
whose pricing patterns during the collusive period resemble those observed in the four target
cities – the cyclical group. These stations receive the indirect treatment, and so we label them TI .
The third group is a set of stations that can be used as a competitive benchmark against which to
compare the behavior of stations receiving the direct and indirect treatments, in the spirit of the
test proposed by Porter and Zona (1999, 1993). We define the competitive control group as stations
with nearly symmetric pricing and low margin, and label these stations C. In addition to the 6
stations in the target cities, our main sample includes 38 stations in the cyclical group, distributed
across 29 cities and 81 stations in the competitive control group distributed across 49 cities.
Our main empirical strategy is to compare pricing in the treatment markets to pricing in the
control markets during and after the collapse of the cartels. This approach hinges on a number
of important assumptions. The first is that we are able to properly identify the cartel period.
The second is that after the cartel ceased functioning prices returned to competitive levels, and
the third is that we are able to adequately control for market-specific developments during the
operation of the cartel.
We are only able to directly test the first of these assumptions in our empirical analysis, which
is split into three subsections. First, we test for structural breaks in the time-series of margins, to
evaluate the appropriateness of using the execution of the warrants to measure the collapse of the
cartel. Second, we analyze the data using a series of mean tests, looking both at inter-temporal and
cross-sectional differences in margins and price adjustments. Finally, we perform a difference-in-
difference regression analysis, controlling for market-specific characteristics during the operation
of the cartel. In Section 5.4 we discuss a series of caveats including the possibility that prices do
not return immediately to competitive levels following the announcement.
5.1. Tests for structural break. In this section we test for breaks in the time series of margins. Our
objective is to confirm that there was a discrete change in behavior, and that this change coincided
with the announcement. Moreover, if our second hypothesis, that collusion also took place in the
cyclical markets, is correct, then we should also observe a break near the date of the announcement
in these markets. In contrast, in the competitive controls there should be no discernible change.
We test for breaks between the beginning of 2005 (just before the wire-taps started) and the end
of our sample period by calculating the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic for each station
in our sample. The QLR statistic is a modified Chow test which tests for breaks in the regression
coefficients at all possible dates in the range. That is, for any hypothesized break date τ in the
range, we consider the regression:
(2) Marginjw = αj + γjDw(τ) + ujw,
where Dw(τ) is a binary variable equal to zero before the break date and one after, and jw index
stations and weeks. The hypothesis of a break at date τ is tested using an F-statistic that tests
the hypothesis that γj is equal to zero. The QLR selects the largest of the resulting F-statistics to
determine where is the break (see Stock and Watson (2003)).
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TABLE III. Number of weeks following the announcement that structural break occurred
Markets 25% 50% 75% Proportion of
significant breaks
Magog 4 4 4 100%
Sherbrooke 9 11.5 14 100%
Thetford-Mines 0 0 0 100%
Victoriaville 4 4 4 100%
TI 3 9 15 89%
C -6 4 9 21%
Break date estimated using the QLR statistic. The last column calculate the fraction of stations for which the structural
break is statistically significant at the 5% level, using using critical values of the QLR statistic with 15% weeks trimming.
We compute the QLR statistic for each station in our sample and present aggregate results for
each of the target markets along with the cycling markets and the competitive control. More
specifically, for each city or group of stations we present the median (along with the 25th and 75th
percentile) number of weeks following the announcement that the break occurred (that had the
largest F-statistic) and the fraction of stations in this city or group for which the test was significant.
Results are presented in Table III. We find that for all stations in our sample the date at which the
largest Chow statistic occurs is within weeks of the announcement. However, these QLR statistics
are not always significant. At all of the target stations and at 89% of the stations in the cyclical
markets the QLR statistic exceeds the 5% critical value suggesting that for these stations we can
reject the null hypothesis of no break. In contrast, only in 21% of stations in the competitive control
is the QLR statistic significant.
Stations in Thetford Mines, Victoriaville, and Magog all break within the first month following
the announcement. In Sherbrooke the maximal Chow test is estimated at approximately three
months after the announcement, but Chow tests at dates between this date and the announcement
all reject the null hypothesis of constant parameters suggesting that there is a slow evolution of
the regression function starting at the announcement. The other cyclical markets all break around
the same time as Sherbrooke, suggesting that the announcement triggered a price war that began
around two and a half months later in the Eastern part of the province.
These breaks can also be visually detected in Figure 4, by inspecting the evolution of weekly
modal prices in each of the four cities targeted by the investigation. The margins in Victoriaville
and Thetford Mines quickly converged to zero early in the summer of 2006, while stations in
Sherbrooke and Magog sustained higher margins in July and August. As we discuss in greater
detail in Section 5.4, the slower response in Sherbrooke and Magog is explained by the fact that the
cartel became increasing unstable during the wire-tap period, suggesting that the initial stages of
the investigation raised suspicions among firms. We also detect instability in the two other cities
(especially in the Fall if 2005), but the conversations recorded by the Competition Bureau suggest
that the cartel leaders were able to maintain high margins throughout 2005. In comparison, prices
in all four markets were more stable and exhibited higher margins before the beginning of the
investigation, in the Fall of 2004. Figure 5 in the Appendix presents the time-series evolution of
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FIGURE 4. Evolution of weekly prices and floor in the four targeted cities before
and after the announcement (dotted line: price floor; vertical line: announcement)
prices and margins between 2002 and May 2006. Note that if we extend our tests for structural
break further back, we capture a break in Victoriaville in the Spring of 2004 that coincides with
turbulence mentioned in the newspaper article that launched the investigation of the cartels.
These results confirm the appropriateness of using the announcement date to test for the effect
of the collapse of collusion, and provide our first evidence that it caused a discrete change in
pricing behavior. Moreover, they justify our use of difference-in-difference analysis since the target
and cyclical markets all break on or around the date, while the hypothesis of no break cannot be
rejected in the competitive control. This is what we turn to next.
5.2. Difference-in-difference analysis. In this section we evaluate the effect of the execution of
the search warrants on pricing. We employ a difference-in-difference strategy in which we com-
pare changes in margins and price adjustment asymmetries in the treatment markets to those in
other markets.
Table IV presents the average outcomes across the three groups, before and after the announce-
ment. The bottom right-hand corner presents the six difference-in-difference estimates, with ei-
ther TI or TD as treatment group, and using either C or TI as control. In the last three rows and
last two columns we decompose these estimates to present cross-sectional (rows) and time-series
(columns) differences. The superscripts indicate the statistical significance of each mean differ-
ence. Since the number of observations in the treatment group is relatively small (i.e. only four
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TABLE IV. Average outcomes before and after the announcement
Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement Differences: Post–Pre
MARKETS Margin Adjustment Margin Adjustment Margin Adjustment
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Target cities
Magog 6.7 2.56 5.5 2.27 -1.2 -.293
Sherbrooke 6.88 3.54 5.88 2.45 -1.00 -1.09
Thetford-Mines 7.6 3 4.8 2.17 -2.80 -.83
Victoriaville 6.85 2.93 2.75 .579 -4.10 -2.35
Avg. target (TD) 6.96 3.08 4.59 1.75 -2.37a,α -1.33a,α
Avg. cyclical (TI ) 7.42 3.41 6.37 2.54 -1.05a,α -.871a,α
Competitive (C) 3.84 1.57 3.76 1.78 -.085 .210c
Differences: TD − C 3.11a,α 1.52a,α .83 .03 -2.28b,α -1.54a,α
Differences: TD − TI -.46b -.33β -1.77b,β -.79c,β -1.31c,γ -.46
Differences: TI − C 3.57a,α 1.85a,α 2.61a,α .77a,α -.97a,α -1.08a,α
a, b, and c denote significance levels for means tests (a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.1). α, β, and γ denote significance
levels for Wilcoxon tests (α: p<0.01, β: p<0.05, γ: p<0.1). Margins for each entry corresponds to the median station-
level margins over the corresponding period, averaged across all stations belonging to each market (rows). Adjustment
ratios are similarly calculated at the station level, and then averaged across all stations belonging to each market-period
pair. The sample corresponds to the balanced panel of 125 stations, between January 2002 and March 2007.
cities or eight stations in TD), we also report the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests which are
valid even with a small number of policy changes.
The first thing to note from the table is that, consistent with our discussion above, prior to the
announcement margins and price adjustments were very similar between TD and TI , but different
between each of these and C. Margins in TD and TI were 6.96 cpl and 7.42 cpl respectively, but
only 3.84 cpl in C. Adjustment asymmetry is measured to be 3.08 in TD and 3.41 in TI , but just 1.57
in C. Overall, the TD − TI differences are only marginally statistically significant (i.e. only t-test
for margins, and only the Wilcoxon test for the ratio), while all the TD −C and TI −C differences
are statistically different from zero at a 1% level.
In the post-announcement sample the differences between TD and C are no longer statistically
significant, and the differences between TI and C are considerably smaller. This is especially
striking for the adjustment asymmetry measure. Note that these changes are not the result of
changes in the control markets after the announcement, but rather stem from changes at stations
in the two treatment groups. Margins fall by 2.37 cpl in TD and 1.05 cpl in TI , and by only 0.085
cpl in C. Formal means and Wilcoxon tests confirm that in the cases of TD and TI these differences
are significantly different from 0. The decrease in adjustment ratio is measured to be 1.33 in TD
and 0.88 in TI , but not significantly different from zero in C.
Since the control markets did not experience any big change after the announcement, the difference-
in-difference is very similar to the simple difference, especially when considering the direct effect.
In fact all three ways of measuring the direct treatment effect yield similar results: for margins,
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the pre-announcement treatment minus control difference is 3.11 cpl, the post-collapse minus pre-
collapse difference is -2.37 cpl, and the difference-in-difference is -2.28 cpl, while for adjustment
asymmetry the equivalent differences are 1.52, -1.33, and -1.54 respectively.
The final point from the table is that, while both TD and TI experienced decreases in margins,
the TD - TI difference-in-difference suggests that the direct effect of the announcement was more
pronounced than the indirect effect. This is intuitive, since the announcement of the investigation
directly impacted the probability of criminal prosecutions in the target markets.
Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix show the locations of stations experiencing bigger and smaller
changes in margin and adjustment ratio across the Southern regions of the province respectively.20
It is clear from these maps that stations in the East are more likely to experience large decreases in
margins and have more symmetric pricing following the execution of the search warrants.
5.3. Regression analysis. The general message from Table IV is that changes in margins and ad-
justment ratios following the execution of the warrants in both the target markets and the other
cyclical markets were more important than in the competitive control markets. However, a careful
econometric analysis will be necessary to disentangle the changes that are due to the execution of
the warrants from those that were driven by market structure changes. This is what we do in this
subsection.
We start by performing a set of regressions in which we explain changes in the median values
of outcome variables at the station level. Our main econometric specification is:
(3) ∆yj = βI (j ∈ TD) + αI (j ∈ TI) + γZj + ej ,
where ∆yj is the change in the outcome variable (margins or asymmetry of adjustment) after
the announcement. Zj is a vector of market structure controls including the values in both lev-
els and changes of the total number of stations, the share selling branded gasoline, the one-firm
concentration ratio and the HHI measured using the share of stations by brand. The change is
measured between the first quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2007. The levels are the post-
announcement values. Zj also includes the change in the number of weeks surveyed before and
after.
The parameter β captures the direct effect of the collapse of communication, and α the indirect
effect. The number of observations is equal to the number of stations because the four outcome
variables are aggregated before and after the announcement of the investigation. We estimate
only a common treatment effect, due to the small number of observations. Finally, we consider
two different pre-collapse windows. In the two left-hand side columns the pre-collapse window
covers the full January 2002 to May of 2006 period (229 weeks). In the right-hand side columns we
present results for a shorter window that starts only in January of 2005 just before the wire-taps
began (74 weeks).
Results from the estimation of (1) are presented in the top panel of Table V. We measure the
direct effect of the announcement on margins to be −2.27 cpl, and on adjustment asymmetry to
20The maps include only a fraction of cities covered by the pricing survey. In particular it excludes stations surveyed
in the far-Eastern, far-Western, and Northern regions of the province (e.g. Hull/Gatineau, Gaspe´, and Chicoutimi).
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TABLE V. Effect of the announcement on margins and ratios
Pre-announcement windows
229 weeks before 74 weeks before
VARIABLES ∆ Margin ∆ Adjustment ∆ Margin ∆ Adjustment
Ratio Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multiple treatments
Target cities (TD) -2.269a -1.630a -1.736a -1.782b
(0.542) (0.576) (0.323) (0.705)
Cyclical cities (TI) -1.039a -0.967a -1.019a -0.976a
(0.220) (0.199) (0.187) (0.314)
Control group C C C C
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.610 0.416 0.495 0.306
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Single treatment
Target cities (TD) -1.051b -0.793c -0.640b -1.035c
(0.436) (0.412) (0.300) (0.560)
Control group TI TI TI TI
Observations 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.702 0.552 0.526 0.445
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the municipality level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. Target cities (TD)
correspond to stations targeted by the Bureau investigation, and Cyclical cities (TI ) include stations with high margins
and asymmetric price adjustment ratio before the announcement: (1− TD)× 1(Ratio > 2)1(Margin > 6)
be −1.63. Our estimates suggest that there is also an indirect effect of the announcement on mar-
gins and adjustment asymmetry, that in both cases is smaller in magnitude than the direct effect.
Margins fall by 1.04 cpl and adjustment asymmetry by 0.97. Shortening the pre-announcement
window has little effect on results. Notice also that the treatment effects estimated controlling
for market-structure variables are very similar to the difference-in-difference estimates reported
in Table IV (i.e. without controls), suggesting that the treated markets did not experience impor-
tant contemporaneous changes in the number and composition of stations. However, tests reveal
that the market structure variables are jointly significant suggesting that these variables matter for
margins and adjustment asymmetry.
Using stations from the competitive group as our control may, under certain circumstances, be
problematic. Specifically, stations in this group may have been subject to a different set of trends
before and/or after the announcement. Recall that many of the stations in this group are in the
Western part of the province while stations in the two treatment groups are predominantly in the
East. As such, results derived using the competitive control group may be confounded by the
presence of region-specific unobserved trends.
To address this issue, in the bottom panel of Table V we present results from a different specifi-
cation. We consider only the direct treatment, and estimate the effect of the announcement using
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TABLE VI. Decomposing ratios
Pre-announcement windows
229 weeks before 74 weeks before
VARIABLES ∆ Incr ∆ Decr ∆ Incr ∆ Decr
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target cities (TD) -0.818 0.400a -0.585 0.598a
(0.523) (0.0585) (0.513) (0.103)
Cyclical cities (TI) -0.928a 0.153a -0.360c 0.374a
(0.174) (0.0506) (0.182) (0.0691)
Control group C C C C
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.352 0.380 0.117 0.435
VARIABLES ∆ % Incr ∆ % Decr ∆ % Incr ∆ % Decr
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Target cities (TD) 0.0247c -0.0665a -0.00825 -0.115a
(0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0247)
Cyclical cities (TI) 0.0564a 0.0285b 0.0323b -0.0278b
(0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0126)
Control group C C C C
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.298 0.298 0.287 0.384
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the municipality level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. Target cities (TD)
correspond to stations targeted by the Bureau investigation, and Cyclical cities (TI ) include stations with high margins
and asymmetric price adjustment ratio before the announcement: (1− TD)× 1(Ratio > 2)1(Margin > 6)
stations located in the cyclical markets as controls. Under this specification we measure the direct
treatment relative to stations mainly located in the Eastern part of the province. Since these sta-
tions are closer both in terms of geography and pricing patterns, it is more likely that they were
subject to similar trends. We find that margins and adjustment asymmetries fell to 1.05 cpl and
0.79, and remain significantly different from zero. Of course, if stations in the cyclical markets
were colluding and reacted to the announcement, these measures understate the direct effect of
the collapse. As a result we interpret these effects as a lower bound on the effect of collusion on
margins and the adjustment ratio.
In Table VI we decompose the ratio effect. We measure the effect of the announcement on price
increases and price decreases, expressed relative to the median increase/decrease of the price
floor over the period surveyed. The regression coefficients therefore measure the change in the
relative price increase/decrease rather than in the level. Median price cuts in the cartel cities
increased significantly. Price increases also decreased in magnitude after the announcement, but
the difference is not statistically significant for the cartel cities. In the bottom panel we look at the
effect of the announcement on the likelihood of increasing or decreasing price (on the fraction of
weeks in which there was a price increase or decrease). In the cartel cities price decreases occur
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less frequently. In the cyclical markets the announcement has a positive effect on the number of
increases, and an ambiguous effect on the number of decreases. Overall, these results suggest
that by preventing firms in the cartel cities from communicating the announcement increased the
magnitude of price cuts, and eliminated the asymmetry that existed between price increases and
decreases. Following the announcement there were fewer, but larger price decreases.
Weekly analysis of margins. In this subsection we adopt another approach to address the concern
raised above that our results may be confounded by region-specific unobserved trends. We disag-
gregate the data at the weekly level and introduce region-specific linear trends in the regression
specifications. We cannot analyze the degree of price asymmetry at this level of aggregation,
and thus focus only on margins. We estimate the following specification with and without linear
group-level trends:
yjw = β1I (w ≥ A) + β2I (j ∈ TD) · I (w ≥ A) + β3I (j ∈ TI) · I (w ≥ A)
+γZjw + θRjTrendRj ,w + µj + ujw,(4)
where yjw is the margin for station j in weekw, I(·) is an indicator function,A is the announcement
week, µj is a station fixed effect, and Zjw is a vector of time-varying controls including the current
and lagged rack price and quarterly dummy variables. Parameter β2 captures the direct effect of
the announcement, while β3 captures the indirect effect. Finally, θRj is associated with a linear
trend affecting margins for all stations in the region of station j.21 We use three regions: TD, TI ,
and C.
In Table VII we present results for both the full pre-collapse window covering the January 2002
to May of 2006 period (columns 1-4), and also the shorter window that covers only the year prior
to the announcement (columns 5-8). We also present results for both the balanced panel of 125
stations (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), and a larger unbalanced panel (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Results
are unchanged when using the unbalanced panel, and so we will focus our discussion on the
balanced-panel specifications.
From column 1 we can see that the direct effect is measured to be -1.69 and the indirect effect
-0.46. With the shorter pre-announcement window, the direct effect is measured to be smaller,
at -1.10 cpl, while the indirect effect is larger, at -0.59. The direct effect may be smaller with the
shorter window because there is some evidence that the cartels were already becoming unstable
in the year leading up to the collapse. As we discuss in further detail in the next section, the
investigation that began in 2005 may have generated changes in pricing behavior that began even
before the execution of the warrants.
In column 3 we add region-specific trends. Including these trends results in a stronger indirect
effect, and a weaker direct effect with the full pre-announcement window, and much stronger
direct and indirect effects with the shorter window. Again, this is likely related to the instability
of the cartel. The major contributor to the pre-collapse trend is the progressive collapse of the
cartel throughout 2005. The TD trend picks up this gradual collapse and explains why we find
a stronger effect in the target markets once we control for group-level trends with the shorter
21The trend variable is defined as: TrendRj ,w = 1(j ∈ R) · w.
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TABLE VII. Effect of the announcement on margins
Pre-announcement time window
VARIABLES Maximum weeks before=229 Maximum weeks before=74
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
I(w > A) · I(j ∈ TD) -1.694a -1.499a -0.956a -0.903a -1.102a -1.053a -2.159a -2.143a
(0.572) (0.514) (0.277) (0.253) (0.268) (0.270) (0.562) (0.480)
I(w > A) · I(j ∈ TI) -0.460a -0.511a -0.778a -0.877a -0.586a -0.659a -1.765a -1.840a
(0.143) (0.121) (0.171) (0.151) (0.136) (0.127) (0.157) (0.139)
Regional trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 33,197 62,631 33,197 62,631 13,830 29,635 13,830 29,635
R-squared 0.052 0.063 0.056 0.066 0.060 0.070 0.068 0.078
Number of stations 125 313 125 313 125 284 125 284
Avg. T 265.6 200.1 265.6 200.1 110.6 104.3 110.6 104.3
Standard-errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. Columns 1, 3, 5,
and 7 are for the balanced panel. Target cities (TD) correspond to stations targeted by the Bureau investigation, and
Cyclical cities (TI ) include stations with high margins an asymmetric price adjustment ratio before the announcement:
(1− TD)× 1(Ratio > 2)1(Margin > 6).
window. In contrast, to our knowledge there is no obvious systematic pre-2005 trend that we
would expect to show up in the longer window.
Overall the weekly results are consistent with the results presented in the previous subsection,
but are smaller in magnitude. The difference in magnitude comes from the fact that we used
changes in median margins in the previous subsection, while the weekly OLS regression estimates
the change in average margins. As we discussed above, margins in the treatment group exhibit
several outliers, both before and after the announcement. Before the announcement, we observe
only a few price war episodes in which prices stayed close to the floor for a few weeks. Conversely,
after the announcement, we observe at least two episodes during which stations appeared to have
tried to (unsuccessfully) restore high margins. Because of these outliers, the average change in
margins is smaller than the median change.
Erutku and Hildebrand (2010) use data from a market research firm, MJ Ervin, to study the effect
of the announcement on prices. MJ Ervin surveys stations in a small number of larger Canadian
cities on a weekly basis, but makes available only a city-level average price. They study the effect
of the announcement on prices in Sherbrooke using Montreal or Que´bec City as controls. Their
results show that prices in Sherbrooke decreased by 1.75 cpl when Montreal is used as a control
group, but not at all relative to Que´bec City. Our results are consistent with theirs, and provide
further details as to why the results are sensitive to the choice of control. In particular, stations
located in the Que´bec City market tend to have pricing strategies similar to those used in the cartel
cities, and, as we showed above, reacted to the announcement by decreasing their prices. Since
markets in the Montreal area tend to be more competitive (i.e. symmetric pricing), the difference-
in-difference estimates are nearly doubled when we use only those markets as controls.
It is worth noting that our station-level data-set predicts a smaller effect in Sherbrooke and Ma-
gog than what Erutku and Hildebrand (2010) found using the MJ Ervin city-averages. As hinted in
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Table IV, the margin changes in Sherbrooke and Magog are less than half of the changes observed
in Thetford-Mines and Victoriaville. When we estimate equation 4 solely using Sherbrooke and
Magog stations, we obtain an estimate of the announcement effect between 0.5 and 0.75 cpl; sig-
nificantly smaller than what is reported by Erutku and Hildebrand (2010) (i.e. nearly 2 cpl). We
interpret this difference as most likely coming from the aggregation of station-level prices, as well
as possible differences in the type and location of stations surveyed by MJ Ervin and the Re´gie.
5.4. Caveats. The objective of our empirical analysis was to test for collusive behavior in the tar-
get and cyclical markets. Our difference-in-difference approach hinged on a series of assumptions,
some of which are not testable. Therefore, our conclusions are subject to the following caveats.
First, the length of the period after the announcement is relatively short (around 40 weeks). In
comparison we can compute margins and price adjustment statistics for more than 200 weeks be-
forehand. This limitation of our data-set prevents us from making general statements about the
long-run impact of the collapse on prices. For instance, it is possible that the target markets expe-
rienced a period of transition following the announcement, and that firms managed to coordinate
prices in a more tacit way afterwards.
A second and related point is that there may be a bias in using the post-cartel period to deter-
mine the ”but-for-collusion” price. As pointed out by Harrington (2004), knowing that damages
might be based on the difference between cartel prices and post-cartel prices, firms may strategi-
cally keep their price closer to the collusive price in order to minimize damages.22 It is possible
that there was also a strategic pricing response by firms in the cyclical markets to the announce-
ment. These firms may not have been behaving collusively at all, and their reaction to the an-
nouncement may simply have been the result of not wanting to raise suspicions as a result of their
pricing strategies.
Third, as mentioned above, the majority of the cyclical stations are located in the Eastern part
of the province. As a result, we cannot disentangle the indirect effect of the announcement from
a spatial shock common to firms in the East. For instance, since stations in the Eastern part of
the province have access to only one refinery, it is possible that outcomes resulting from changes
occurring at the refinery level might be confounded with outcomes stemming from the execution
of the warrants. If that is the case, we can only estimate the effect of the announcement on prices
in the target markets relative to stations in the Eastern regions of the province. As we saw in Table
V this leads to a smaller estimate, though still significantly different from zero.
Finally, there is some evidence in the Competition Bureau documents that the collusive agree-
ments had already become unstable several months before the announcement, especially in Ma-
gog. Towards the end of the second quarter of 2005, several station operators and chain managers
grew worried about the legal consequences of talking about prices over the phone. Our hypothesis
is that these concerns emerged after the publication of the 2004 article that triggered the Compe-
tition Bureau investigation. At least two vertically integrated brands, Irving and Petro-Canada,
sent letters and official warnings to their lessee station operators to prevent them from discussing
22There is also experimental evidence that firms can continue to collude successfully even after explicit communication
has been disabled, which would bias results in the same direction (see Fonseca and Normann (2011)).
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prices with competitors over the phone. For instance, on April 19th, 2005 the Irving regional repre-
sentative discussed the new policy with his Couche-Tard counterpart, with whom he had a supply
relationship: “It’s possible that I won’t be able to discuss with our little friends. The competition.
[...] The only one I will be able to continue to speak with will be you. I will change my price and
you’ll decide on your own”.23 Later on April 18th 2006, Bourassa, co-leader of the Sherbrooke and
Magog cartel, reportedly ceased all communications with competitors (other than Couche Tard)
after expressing fears of going to prison for collusive activity.24
These concerns may explain why the margin decline in Sherbrooke and Magog was smaller than
what we observe in Victoriaville and Thetford Mines. A similar pattern can be observed from the
distribution of adjustment-ratio changes in Table V . While the change in ratio in Victoriaville is
clearly much larger than that of stations in C or even in T2, the ratio change in Magog is not much
different than that of stations in T2. Changes in Sherbrooke and Thetford Mines are larger, but
nonetheless are less pronounced than what we observe for margins.
6. CONCLUSION
Our analysis reveals that the pricing strategies of stations featured asymmetric adjustments
and high margins, and that following the execution of the warrants margins fell and adjustments
became more symmetric in these markets. For the target markets, these results complement the
information obtained via the Competition Bureau investigation and imply that collusion was suc-
cessful and led to an increase in margins of 2.27 cpl during the collusive period. This corresponds
roughly to a fifty percent increase in retail margins, relative to margins observed in the competitive
regions of the province. The empirical results, in conjunction with the evidence from the Compe-
tition Bureau documents suggest that asymmetric price adjustments were part of the collusive
mechanism. For the other cyclical markets the results provide suggestive, but not conclusive, ev-
idence of collusive behavior. There is no direct evidence of explicit communication taking place
outside the target markets, and so it is more difficult to attribute the observed changes in pricing
entirely to collusive behavior.
Our findings have ramifications for how economists view asymmetric cycles. While high mar-
gins have long been associated with collusive behavior, conventional wisdom suggests that col-
lusive pricing should exhibit a constant markup rule. This is clearly not the case in the cartels
uncovered in Que´bec, since price changes are asymmetric, while cost changes are not. More-
over, not only do we observe firms explicitly coordinating their actions, some pricing patterns
differ from the predictions of the Maskin-Tirole model. In particular, the identities of the firms
increasing and decreasing prices are invariant and are known to all, suggesting that firms are not
alternatively undercutting each other. We also do not find any evidence to support the type of
menu costs or information lags that are necessary to generate the alternative move structure that
is at the heart of the Maskin-Tirole model. Instead while firms do move sequentially, information
23Translation from the original French conversation: “C¸a ne se peut que je n’ai plus le droit de parler a` nos petits amis.
La competition. (...) Le seul qu’on var continuer a parler ca va eˆtre avec vous autres (Couche-Tard). (...) Je vais changer
mes prix et tu t’arrangeras.”
24From Annex C, page 118, paragraph 691.
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about price changes is easily transmitted, and the time lag between price changes is an outcome
of the collusive agreement rather than the result of a market friction.
Because our data are weekly and not of higher frequency, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the competitive cities exhibit this type of short-lived cycle, or that the impact of the announcement
was to shorten the cycle length from close to a month to less than a week. Other sources suggest
that prices in competitive cities such as Montre´al feature week-long cycles, while prices in cyclical
markets such as Que´bec City feature the longer cycles. Our empirical results combined with this
external evidence suggests that shorter cycles are more likely associated with competitive behav-
ior, while long-lived cycles may be associated with explicit collusion. Lewis and Noel (2011) reach
a similar conclusion by showing that in markets with short-lived cycles, cost-change pass through
is faster.
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APPENDIX A. LEGAL DISCLAIMER AND COMPETITION BUREAU DOCUMENTS
The Canadian Competition Bureau’s investigation into, and prosecution of, the alleged price
fixing in retail gasoline markets in Quebec is ongoing. The allegations of the Competition Bureau
have not been proven in a court of justice. This paper analyses the alleged Quebec retail-gasoline
cartel case strictly from an economic point of view.
For the purpose of this paper, we base our understanding of the facts with respect to the alleged
Quebec retail-gasoline cartel case mostly on documents prepared by the Competition Bureau. We
were given a copy of the 52-page affidavit of Mr. Pierre-Yves Guay of the Competition Bureau
dated May 16, 2006 in file no 500-26-039962-067 of the Superior Court of Quebec, district of Mon-
treal. From the Court, we received copies of the three annexes attached to the affidavit of Mr. Guay.
Annex A is a 143-page document which contains mostly reported wiretap telephone conversations
with respect to the region of Victoriaville; Annex B is a 45-page document which contains mostly
reported wiretap telephone conversations with respect to the region of Thetford Mines; Annex
C is a 121-page document which contains mostly reported wiretap telephone conversation with
respect to the regions of Sherbrooke and Magog. We will refer to the affidavit of Mr. Guay and its
three annexes as the ”Competition Bureau documents.” We also found information on the actions
taken by the Competition Bureau on its website : CompetitionBureau.gc.ca.
The wire taps took place from March to June 2005 in Victoriaville and Thetford-Mines, and from
March to June 2005 and December 2005 to April 2006 in Sherbrooke/Magog. For each price adjust-
ment attempt that is documented, the phone calls are listed along with an extract or a summary of
the individual conversations (including information about who made the call, who received the
call, and the time of the call). For example, pages 27 and 41 of Annex A represent a typical entry for
a price adjustment attempt. The annex makes reference to a 4 cent per liter price increase attempt
on April 6th 2005 in Victoriaville. The Competition Bureau explains that the increase was initiated
by two players and that twenty-three gas stations were involved. The annex lists these stations,
and then summarizes eighty-eight telephone conversations which took place between 6:44 am and
3:42 pm. The summaries explain that the price increase was to take place at 9:15 am. Finally, in the
annex the Bureau concludes that according to observations in the field, the agreement had been
executed.
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APPENDIX B. EXTRACT FROM NEWSPAPER ARTICLE THAT LAUNCHED THE COMPETITION
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, La Nouvelle 1994.
The cartels were discovered following the publication on June 6th 2004 of an article in a Victo-
riaville newspaper describing an interview with gas station owner Christian Goulet who claimed
to be the victim of harassment by other station owners for not participating in their attempts to
fix prices. This initiated a Canadian Competition Bureau investigation into suspected collusive
behavior in violation of Section 45 of the Competition Act.
Below is an extract from the newspaper article:
Ce n’est pas la premie´re fois que M. Goulet veut provoquer une guerre de prix. Il l’avait aussi
fait en 1993... et avait fait la manchette, ses pompes ayant e´te´ brise´es a coups de hache.
Lui et meˆme ses employe´s auraient rec¸u une dizaine de coups de file au cours des derniers
jours, l’enjoignant de remonter le prix de son essence. Certains ont joue´ de l’humour et de l’ironie.
Mais d’autres se faisaient carre´ment menac¸ants, du genre: “On va s’arranger pour te faire fermer.”
Christian Goulet dit qu’il en a assez de cette “clique” qui fait en sorte qu’a Victoriaville, un prix
unique soit offert... et toujours plus haut qu’ailleurs au Quebec. “C’est pas normal! Les gens qui
de´nocent cette situation dans les rubriques de lettres d’opinions on bien raison. Moi je veux avoir
le droit de vendre l’essence au prix que je veux, sans me faire menacer.”
English translation:
It is not the first time that Mr. Goulet wanted to initiate a price war. He also did it in 1993... and,
as the newspaper reported, his pumps were broken with an axe.
He and even his employes received several phone calls over the last few days, pressuring him
to raise the price of his gas. Some were humorous and ironic. But others were more threatening
of the sort: “We will make sure that you close down.”
Christian Goulet says that he tired of this “clique” who makes sure that in Victoriaville, only
one price is offered... and is always higher than elsewhere in Que´bec. “It is not normal! People
who complain about this situation in letters to the newspaper are right. I would like to have the
right to sell gas at whatever price I want without being threatened.”
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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Dotted line: Price floor; Solid line: Representative station’s price; Vertical line: Publication of the newspaper article,
Grey areas: Wire-tap periods.
FIGURE 5. Evolution of weekly prices and floor in the four targeted cities and Mon-
treal between January of 2002 and May of 2006
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